it not only to the individuals themselves but also to pohcymakers and scholars. This process has attracted increased attention in recent years because of, among other things, announcements by major corporations of large layoffs, technological changes that have resulted in relatively more high-skilled jobs, the alleged effects of changes in trade legislation on the location of business activity, and the high levels of unemployment in Western Europe. Policymakers have been attempting to design training and other programs that would help match an individual's skills with the requirements of potential employers: Job-search models offer some solutions by considering factors that deteranine individuals' wage demands and, therefore, their prospects for finding an acceptable job offer. Job-search theory takes concepts from static labor market analysis and uses them in an intertemporal setting. It attempts to describe the problems faced by unemployed individuals and to propose strategies for making optional employment decisions.
An Introduction to the Theory and Estimation of a Job-Search Model
Adam M. Zaretsky and Cletus C. Coughlin n a dynamic labor market, the process by which people find new jobs is important it not only to the individuals themselves but also to pohcymakers and scholars. This process has attracted increased attention in recent years because of, among other things, announcements by major corporations of large layoffs, technological changes that have resulted in relatively more high-skilled jobs, the alleged effects of changes in trade legislation on the location of business activity, and the high levels of unemployment in Western Europe. Policymakers have been attempting to design training and other programs that would help match an individual's skills with the requirements of potential employers: Job-search models offer some solutions by considering factors that deteranine individuals' wage demands and, therefore, their prospects for finding an acceptable job offer. Job-search theory takes concepts from static labor market analysis and uses them in an intertemporal setting. It attempts to describe the problems faced by unemployed individuals and to propose strategies for making optional employment decisions.
To introduce the job-search process, we describe a simple model focusing on the search behavior of an unemployed individual. The worker is assumed to he looking for a job, but may encounter unsuitable offers. In this model, the unemployed individual's decision to acceptor reject an offer is reduced to a comparison of the expected benefits from an additional search with the expected costs.
We then introduce a regression model that consists of two equations: one focusing on the individual's probability of reemployment and the other on the individual's expected wage upon employment. Heckman's sample-selection model forms the basis for the statistical analysis because simple regression analysis does not account for the truncated wage information about people who are not presently working and, therefore, leads to biased inferences of the determinants of wage offers.
To illustrate the job-search model, we utilize survey data collected by the St. Louis Economic Adjustment and Diversification Committee from a sample of approximately 1,200 former McDonnell Douglas employees laid off because of defense spending cuts. This survey was the first analysis in the United States that tracked the reemployment history of laid-off defense workers. The illustration highlights the effects that variables such as occupation, education, sex, tenure at McDonnell Douglas and unemployment insurance have on the chance of reempLoyment and prospective wage offers.
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Job-search theory models individuals' decisions of whether to participate in the labor market and whether to change or leave jobs. To convey the major points of the job-search process, we present a simple model that focuses on the basic search behavior of an unemployed worker.' The worker is assutned to he looking for a job htrt, lacking perfect information, may cncotmnter unsuitable offers before finding a job. Eac:h rime the unemployed worker receives a job offer, he decides whether to accept the offer based on a previously determined set of criteria. These criteria are extremely important in the decision-making process and are the subject of our investigation.
See Kate (1994) 
Underlying Assumptions
The worker receives job offers that include the wage, hours, benefits and working conditions of the position. For simplicity, however, we assume that the decision to accept or reject the job is based solely on the wage offer. We further assume that hours froan all offers are fixed, making "wages" and "earnings" interchangeable. Setting hours equal to one allows iv to signify both wages and earnings.
The worker does not know which firm will offer a particular iv. He is aware, however. of the general characteristics of the labor market. Offers represent independent realizations from a wage offer distribution with finite mean and variance. Specifically, wage offers have a cumulative distribution F(w) and probability density jXw) that are known to the worker. If the worker does not have an expectation of the types of offers made by particufar firms, a random search occurs, where independent draws from F are made without recall-once ajob is passed over, it can never be returned to. t We assume the worker's income remains constant during the spell of unemployment. This allows for a constant opportunity cost, against which he bases the accept/reject decision. If the individual is risk-neutral, income and utility are equivalent, and we can investigate the individual au.einpting to maximize the expected present discounted value of income. To facilitate the analysis, we also assume the discount rate, r, is known and constant. In addition, the individual keeps the accepted job forever, implying that he lives forever. Hence, the present discounted value of a job paying w is w/r. This final assumption is not too drastic as long as the discount rate is greater than zero and retirement (or death) is not too close.
These assumptions lead to the worker being equally well-off during the entire unemployment spell. Because income during unemployment never diminishes, utility while unemployed retnains constant and no signal about the length of the uneanployment spell is offered to a prospective employer. Thus, the newly uneanployed person and the person who has been unemployed mtech longer face the same lob prospects. Because each offer received represents an independent draw from the distribution, the worker's accept! reject decision does not depend on the duration of the unemployment spell.
An Optima! Search Strategy
If the worker accepts the offer iv, the present value of income received in this and all future periods is w/r. If the worker rejects the offer, the expected present value of income will equal the expected present value of unemployment income received until an acceptable offer is received, plus the expected present value of the income from the acceptable offer. This expectation does not depend on the offer currently being rejected hut does depend on the distribution of offers F.
Because the value of employment, w!r, is an increasing function of the wage offer, there must be values of w for which employment is an attractive option; otherwise, the worker would never enter the labor market. There must also be values of w for which employnnent is not an attractive option; otherwise, the first wage offer would autonnatically be accepted. Therefore, a wage must exist at which the value of employnnent equals the value of unemployment. This wage is known as the reservation wage, w 0 , and represents an optimal strategy for an individual to follow in this enodel, because at this wage the marginal cost for an additional search equals the marginal gain from an additional search. Therefore, the individual should accept employment only if the wage offer is at least as great as the reservation wage, or continue searching. This analysis represents a much-simplified nnodel of the job-search process. By allowing for a cutoff date for receipt of unemployment incoene, or by introducing finitely lived individuals, we would quickly complicate the model. Each of these changes generates a reservation wage that declines rather than stays constant with duration. This decline occurs in the former from the expectation of income reduction or loss, and in the latter from decreasing the time over which a higher wage would accrue if one waits for a higher wage. By nmaintaining a constant-reservation
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ANUARY/FEBRUARY wage hypothesis, an offer rejected today will also be rejected at any time in the future. Thus, sampling without recall is implied, and the duration of the unemployment spell is unimportant to the decision.
To randomize the receipt of wage offers, we introduce a Poisson process with arrival rate 8, where 8 represents the frequency of arrival. The probability of receiving at least one offer in a short interval, ii, is 8h+o(h), where o(h) is the probability of receiving more than one offer in the interval and
The worker still receives one offer at a time, but the amount of time between offers is not necessarily constant.
To foranalize, let V represent the worker's value of unemployed search under a constant-reservation wage hypothesis. Offers are independently and identically distributed, and the offer distribution and arrival rates are both known and time-invariant. This value is defined implicitly by
The first term on the right-hand side is the present discounted value of the net unem-
The second teren is the probability of receiving an offer in Ii, multiplied by the expected discounted value of following an optimal policy if a wage offer iv is received, where V" (iv) represents the present value of accepting that offer. The third term is the probability of not receiving an offer in h, multiplied by the present discounted value of the search income. The last term is the probability of receiving more than one offer in h, where K denotes the value of the optimal policy when more than one offer is received. Under a Poisson process, the last term goes to zero in the limit.
The present value of accepting an offer iv in this model is
BecauseV'(w) is continuous and increasing in iv, while V 11 does not depend on the wage offer, the optimal strategy for a worker is a time-invariant reservation wage policy: Accept iv if iv iv°°, where iv°°,the reservation wage, is the minimum acceptable wage for the worker. It is defined by equating the expected present value of enmployment with the expected present value of a continued search. That is,
Substituting equations I and 2 into 3 yields:
Solving for wm,~rand taking the lionit as this optimality condition may he written as
Finally, by evaluating this integral and rearranging termns, a more intuitively appealing equation for the reservation wage emerges:
F,, we and J
1-F(w tO
)= Jf(iv)div.
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The left side of equation 6 is the marginal cost of rejecting an offer equal to ive and continuing to search. The right side represents the discounted expected marginal gain from continuing to search, multhphed by the Poisson probability that an acceptable offer is received. In other words, the right side is the discounted expected marginal revenue from an additional search. Thus, the reservation wage is the wage rate that equates the discounted expected mnarginal revenue from a search with the marginal cost of a search, and equation 6 represents the optimal stopping rule for the search.
This definition of the reservation wage contrasts with the definition of a reservation wage in a static, deterministic model of labor supply. In the latter, a reservation wage represents a set of preferences determined solely by supply-side factors (the level of non-labor income, fixed costs of labor market entry, and the marginal utility of leisure) without regard for demand-side factors. Search theory's definition of a reservation wage explicitly and necessarily relies on the distribution of wage offers, a demand-side component, as well as supply-side factors. In addition, the reservation wage depends on the arrival rate of offers, a variable relying on the behavior of both firms and the individual. Specifically, in the search model, (b,r,8,p) .
where ,u is the mean of the wage offer distri-
bution.
Because of the importance placed on the reservation wage in this model, we want to investigate how changes in the exogenous variables in equation 8 affect it. To understand the intuition, we use equation 6 to describe these effects.
Suppose b, the level of fixed unemployment income net of search costs, increases. This decreases the marginal cost for an additional search while keeping all else constant. The left side of the equation is now less than the right side, implying that the cost for an additional search is less than the expected gain from the search. Thus, the worker, attempting to maximize expected income, increases his reservation wage so that marginal cost will once again equal expected marginal gain, restoring the optimal stopping condition. An increase in either the arrival rate of offers 8 or the mean of the wage offer distribution p. produces a similar response because both cause the marginal gain from an additional search to increase (analogous to a decline in the marginal cost).
Suppose, on the other hand, the discount rate r increases. Keeping all else constant, this change decreases the expected gain from an additional search, making it less than the marginal cost. Now, the worker will decrease his reservation wage until the marginal cost once again equals the expected marginal gain, thereby equating margins at the new discount rate to restore the optimal stopping condition.
To formalize the above explanations, we can generate the following derivatives by differentiating the optimality condition in equation 5:
These results reinforce the intuitive explanations given above for how the reservation wage changes as the individual variables change. 
+ >0 dp div dp dp which represents the probability of reemployment, or escape rate, of the worker.°This where escape rate does not depend on calendar time because neither the acceptance strategy nor the distribution from which offers are drawn a.
rely on it. The model, therefore, has direct The right side of lYe is positive because we implications for the distribution of the duraknow from 9d that the increase in the resertions. The implied distribution is exponential.
vation wage due to the increase in the mean Suppose T denotes the duration of a of the offer distribution is less than the completed spell of unemployment with cumuincrease in the distribution itself. lative distribution function W(t) and probaAs expected, the probability of reembility density function gift. The probability ployment increases with increases in both that a received offer leads to reemployment the discount rate and the mean of the offer can now be stated as distribution, and declines as the fixed unem-
ploytnent income net of search costs goes up. How this escape rate reacts to changes in the arrival rate of offers is more compliFurthermore, the probabihty that the spell of cated because, as the following shows, the unemployment will last until at least t can he sign on the derivative is indeterminate: expressed as follows: 
AiM ECONOA.IETRIC MODEL
Having laid down a basic theoretical foundation, we would now like to describe Heckman's saonple-selection regression model as one method to obtain results consistent with the theory. Because we do not observe unaccepted wage offers, the data are truncated and a selection bias exists that this model accounts for by including a regressor for the truncation. The model uses the knowledge that observed wages are offers that satisfied the job seeker's acceptance criteria-that is, the accepted wage was greater than the individual's reservation wage-along \vith the observed wage itself in a two-step regression that generates consistent estimates.
We use Kiefer and Neumann's (1979) The z,'s are worker and labor market characteristics that determine the individual's reservation wage. Because theory suggests that reservation wages depend on the mean of the wage offer distribution and the costs of searching, all variables in x,' must be contained in Z. Therefore, it is assumed that the error terms are jointly distrihuted as bivariate normal with a covariance of c 0
. The most obvious strategy is to assign a dumtny variable to each category. l-Isiao (1983) argues that for a modest number of dummy variables and categories, the loss in explanatory power from using this method is not serious. Interpretation of the coefficients on the dummy variables, however, differs from the standard interpretation of least squares coefficients on continuous variables, and using dummy variables represents a direct loss of information.
Another strategy, discussed in Haitovsky (1973), flsiao (1983) and 1-lsiao and Mountain (1985) , is to use the midpoint of the category's range as the observed value.t Although this anethod is convenient, the estimates are usuall)' biased, unless the data are uniformly distributed over the category, but the bias can be negligible. In addition, this nnethod does not use all of the available inforonation because it excludes the known endpoints of the categories.
To include the endpoint inforonation and obtain representative values other than midpoints, the variables of age, tenure, \vage at McDonnell Douglas and wage at the new job were each regressed as dependent variables against a constant term in a connpletely censored Tobit nnodel. the baseline searcher is a single white male, who was a unionized production worker (one of the occupational categories) at McDonnell Douglas with a high school education or less, who has no children and who did not apply for unemployment insurance.mn To describe how an individual's probability of reemployment (escape rate) changes as different characteristics are added, the probability for the baseline person needs to be known. Using the coefficients from Table 4 and the calculated means of the non-dummy variables, r, can be constructed for the baseline individual.rr \~'/ethen evaluate the normal cumulative density function F at this value of to determine the individual's probability that the next offer will lead to reemployment; for the baseline individual, this probability is 0.6637. In other words, there is about a 66 percent chance that the next wage offer will satisfy the acceptance criteria of a person with the baseline characteristics. rO We used the sample selectior model i n tlMDEP Versiar 6.0 to estimate the eqaatiaas.
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10 Vriaas interaction terms mere tried, butnane signiicaafy altered the results, H Using rotation from Table 2, we calculate o-, far the baseline ladivideal from equation 21' mith the fallawirg:
where c. i s the coefficient estimate fram Table 4 ; therefore: Therefore, this clerical worker's probability that the next received offer will lead to reemployment is about 74 percent. The impact of a change in any other variable in the equation can be calculated analogously.
Predictions of new wages from equation 25 are more straightforward. Realizing that the fitted values from equation 25 are the logarithms of the expected new wages, we need only exponentiate these values to recover the dollar amounts. Based on the coefficients in Table 5 and the means of the relevant variables, the expected new wage for a person with the baseline characteristics is $11.19 per hour.~Any changes in particular characteristics result in a deviation from this wage level. For example, the expected new hourly wage for a clerical worker is $12.62. Thus, all else the same, this clerical worker should expect to receive a wage offer that is 13 percent greater than that received by a comparable production worker. The effect of changes in other variables can he calculated similarly.
Although Table 4 shows that few of the variables are statistically significant, the signs on most of the variables are as expected and the~2 statistic is significant. For example, we know from equation 17a that increases in unemployment income net of search costs decrease the escape rate. Our coefficient on mis negative, as predicted, and statistically significant. In other words, those who applied for unemploytnent compensation tended to have a lower probability of reemployment and, therefore, a longer duration of unemployment. This result is consistent with the literature, which has also found a positive relationship between unemployanent durations and utneonploymenc insurance. Ehrenherg and Oaxaca (1976) , for example, found that durations increased with the receipt of unemployment insurance, Storer and Van .Audenrode (1992) also found that durations increased with the receipt of uneanployment insurance. In addition, they argued that unemployment, spells are not longer because workers collect uneanployment insurance benefits; rather, workers collect benefits because their spells are longer.
The coefficient on TFNURE is negative and significant in the reemployment equation and negative and insignificant in the wage equation. The negative coefficient suggests that this variable might be proxying for time spent away from the market during employment, which affects the worker's job-search skills. An analogy is the depreciation of an individual's human capital that occurs because of extended periods of non-employment. In this case, the depreciation occurs because the lengthy tenure has nnade the worker's job-search skills "rusty." This hurts prospects for reemployment because the worker has to spend time relearning how to search in the new environment. maximizing expected lifetime income, continues to search until the marginal cost for an additional search equals the discounted expected marginal gain from that search. This is achieved at the reservation wage: A worker will accept an offer if and only if the offered wage is at least as great as the reservation wage. This is a dynamic process in which the reservation wage serves as the optimal stopping condition.
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Using data collected by the St. Louis County Economic Council, we estimated this basic model to illustrate what kinds of results can be expected and how they might be interpreted. Using this limited dataset, though, implies that the estimates probably reflect more the specific characteristics of the St. Louis market in the early l990s than any generalization. Nevertheless, the illustration allowed us to peer into the basic equations that describe the job-search and reemployonent activities. In future research, we plan to use this data, along with data from follow-up surveys, to identify the search experiences of those workers laid off from McDonnell Douglas. This information should allow us to make comparisons between predicted and realized wage offers for different categories of workers, thereby providing information about the market and the usefulness of the underlying model. 
